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A Critique of Pimentel v. Dreyfus and the Application of 
Legal Formalism to the Elimination of Food Assistance 
Benefits for Legal Immigrants 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Statute of Liberty, with her torch illuminating the New York 
Harbor, has for years welcomed immigrants from all over the world and 
from all walks of life—the “huddled masses yearning to breathe free.”1 
Unfortunately, in today’s post-recession climate where massive govern-
ment cuts are the topic of daily news, many valuable programs designed 
to welcome, help, and aid immigrants are being targeted for elimination. 
On December 29, 2010, the Washington State Department of Social 
and Health Services (DSHS) adopted a regulation that, as of February 1, 
2011, would eliminate, in whole or in part, basic food assistance for ap-
proximately 10,581 Washington households, affecting 14,350 individu-
als.2 These households all had one thing in common: at least one member 
of the household was receiving basic food assistance from Washington 
State’s Food Assistance Program for legal immigrants (FAP).3 
One of these households was that of Ms. Monica Navarro Pimentel, 
a mother of three and a survivor of domestic violence.4 With the assis-
tance of FAP, Ms. Pimentel was able to support herself and her children.5 
For Ms. Pimentel and other survivors of domestic violence, the loss of 
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 1.  Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, POETS, http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/prmMID/1 
6111 (last visited May 28, 2014).  
 2. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1102. 
 5. Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal Momentum in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at 18, Pimentel v. 
Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-35237). 
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this critical food assistance makes it substantially more difficult to sur-
vive independently from their abusers.6 
In response to DSHS’s decision to eliminate FAP, Ms. Pimentel 
filed a class action lawsuit to enjoin the State from eliminating the pro-
gram.7 She challenged the elimination as a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.8 Initially, a trial 
court granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the State from eliminat-
ing these benefits.9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, re-
versed and vacated the lower court’s ruling and the injunction, finding 
that Ms. Pimentel and, therefore, the class she represented did not have 
standing to bring an Equal Protection or Due Process challenge to the 
State’s decision.10 
In July 2012, FAP11 had not been completely eliminated but was 
reduced by fifty percent by the Washington State legislature.12 The legis-
lature estimated that it could save approximately thirty million dollars 
over the next two years by cutting the program,13 but at what cost to the 
thousands of individuals and families who had relied on FAP to survive? 
The possible elimination of and the fifty percent reduction in FAP 
have had a devastating impact on the immigrant community in Washing-
ton State. With these cuts, approximately 14,000 Washington State chil-
                                                 
 6. Id.  
Termination of food assistance affects multiple categories of battered immigrant women 
and their children. For example, loss of food benefits undermines the ability of battered 
women to leave their abusers, and also endangers battered women who have separated 
from their abusers, because, in addition to the hardships of hunger and malnourishment, 
such women face additional harm when their inability to feed their children drives them 
back into the abusive relationships they were trying to flee. 
Id. at 12. 
 7. Ms. Pimentel was represented by Columbia Legal Services. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1096. 
 8. The 14th Amendment states, “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 9. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1105. 
 10. Id. at 1111. 
 11. The official title of the program is the Food Assistance Program (FAP); however, it is also 
referred to as State Food Assistance and sometimes abbreviated as SFA. Compare State Food Assis-
tance Program (FAP), WASH. ST. DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.dshs.wa.gov/ 
onlinecso/fap.shtml (last visited May 28, 2014), with Policy Brief: State Food Assistance, 
CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE, 1 (Jan. 10, 2013), www.wsahnc.org/download/State_Food_Assistance_ 
policy_brief.pdf. 
 12. 2011 Wash. Sess. Law 78. 
 13. Zach Smith, Food Assistance for Legal Immigrants Will Drop by Half, OLYMPIAN               
(June 30, 2012), http://www.theolympian.com/2012/06/30/2159204/food-assistance-will-drop-by-
half.html. 
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dren lost access to food assistance benefits.14 One recipient of FAP, 
Hidai Johnny of the Marshall Islands, told KUOW News that the fifty 
percent reduction means that his family—which includes himself, his 
wife, their newborn, his grandparents, and a cousin—will have to man-
age with two hundred dollars less each month to pay for food.15 Hidai’s 
story is just one of many.16 
This Comment contends that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Pimen-
tel v. Dreyfus employed a legal formalist approach and that by applying 
this framework, the court prevented legal immigrants, who were caught 
between the strict eligibility restrictions of welfare reform, from asserting 
their rights through the justice system.17 
The legal formalist approach “treats the law as a set of scientific 
formulae or principles that are derived from the study of case law. These 
principles create an internal analytical framework which, when applied to 
a set of facts, leads the decision-maker [sic], through logical deduction, 
to the correct outcome in a case.”18 On the other hand, legal realism in-
cludes the use of social conditions as another variable in reaching a deci-
sion19 “in lieu of mere reliance on legal rules [that] may advance outdat-
ed or dysfunctional policies.”20 
This Comment asserts that the Pimental court missed an opportuni-
ty to promote greater access to the justice system for the immigrant 
community when it used legal formalism to deny Ms. Pimentel’s Four-
teenth Amendment claims and to reject alternative bases for her discrim-
                                                 
 14. Press Release, Children’s Alliance, Majority of Senate Supports Fully Funding State Food 
Assistance (Mar. 19, 2013), available at http://www.childrensalliance.org/sites/default/files/Majority 
_Senate_Supports_Food_Assistance_1.pdf. 
 15. Lesley McClurg, Legal Immigrants Hit Hard by State Budget Cuts, KUOW (July 2, 2012), 
http://www2.kuow.org/program.php?id=27207. 
 16. A letter signed by twenty-six state senators sent to the Washington State Senate Ways and 
Means Committee in support of reinstating FAP stated, “At a time when an estimated one-in-four 
Washington children live in food-insecure households, the 2011 cut to State Food Assistance deep-
ened the economic inequality for many of the youngest Washingtonians.” Letter: Senators in Sup-
port of State Food Assistance, CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE, 1 (Mar. 26, 2013) http://www.childrensalli 
ance.org/sites/default/files/Majority_Senate_Supports_Food_Assistance_26.pdf [hereinafter State 
Senator Letter]. 
 17. Inspiration for this Comment came from an Op-Ed written by Robert Westley, the 
LOCHEF Professor of Legal Ethics & Professional Responsibility at Tulane University Law School. 
Robert Westley, Constitutional Formalism Denies Aid to Legal Immigrants, JURIST-FORUM (Mar. 
17, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/03/robert-westley-pimentel.php. 
 18. Arrie W. Davis, The Richness of Experience, Empathy, and the Role of a Judge: The Senate 
Confirmation Hearings for Judge Sonia Sotomayor, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 10–11 (2009). 
 19. “[F]or the legal realists, a reliance on legal rules alone was misplaced, because rules often 
contained concepts such as ‘reasonableness’ that were subject to varied interpretations . . . .” Id. at 
11. 
 20. Id. 
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ination and property interest claims. Part II provides background infor-
mation on the establishment of FAP, which was created in response to 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996. This Part discusses the positive impact the creation of FAP had on 
the immigrant and larger community, and the crisis that has resulted from 
the reduction of funding for this program. Part II also provides the pro-
cedural history of the Pimentel case. Part III further analyzes the court’s 
decision in the context of legal formalism. Part IV introduces alternative 
methods that the court could have used, instead of legal formalism, to 
determine if Ms. Pimentel would succeed on the merits of her claims. 
Finally, Part V includes a brief conclusion. 
II. THE CREATION AND ELIMINATION OF FAP 
This Part first discusses how the history of food assistance in the 
United States and in Washington State shaped the present allocation of 
food assistance benefits with regard to immigrants. It then discusses how 
the procedural history of Ms. Pimentel’s case shows legal formalism’s 
ability to alter the outcome of a case. 
A. History of SNAP and FAP 
Government food assistance is a recent part of the United States’ 
history. The first federal food assistance program, the Food Stamp Pro-
gram, lasted from 1939 to 1943.21 At its peak, four million people partic-
ipated in the program.22 The program ended in 1943 because “the condi-
tions that brought the program into being—unmarketable food surpluses 
and widespread unemployment—no longer existed.”23 Needless to say, 
over the next twenty years, many senators, representatives, and, most 
notably, President John F. Kennedy worked to reinstate a federal gov-
ernment food assistance program. In fact, President Kennedy’s first Ex-
ecutive Order called for an expansion of food assistance for the poor.24 In 
February of 1961, he initiated a food stamp pilot program that would be-
come, under President Johnson’s administration, a permanent federal 
                                                 
 21. A Short History of SNAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERVICE, http://www. 
fns.usda.gov/snap/rules/Legislation/about.htm (last modified Apr. 26, 2012). “The idea for the first 
FSP is credited to various people, most notably Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace and the 
program’s first Administrator Milo Perkins.” Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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government program established as law under the Food Stamp Act of 
1965.25 
Today, the federal food assistance program is called Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); in Washington, the program is 
administered locally by DSHS.26 Although the federal program went 
through many different renditions since its enactment,27 most legal im-
migrants were eligible to receive federal food assistance subject to the 
program’s income qualifications up until the passage of the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA).28 
PRWORA is commonly known and referred to as the Welfare Re-
form Act.29 This sweeping welfare reform legislation was passed by a 
Republican-controlled Congress, united under its “Contract with Ameri-
ca,”30 and signed by then-President Bill Clinton, who had promised dur-
ing his campaign to “end welfare as we know it.”31 Title IV (Restriction 
Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens) of PRWORA dramatically re-
stricted eligibility requirements for federal and state welfare benefits. 
Title IV’s policy statement reiterates that “[i]t continues to be the immi-
gration policy of the United States that aliens within the Nation’s borders 
not depend on public resources to meet their needs . . . [and] the availa-
bility of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the 
United States.”32 The Act created new classifications for the eligibility of 
legal immigrants. It defined who were “qualified aliens,”33 which effec-
tively served to disqualify almost all legal immigrants that had previous-
ly received this aid. “Qualified aliens” included people lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence; asylum seekers; refugees; immigrants paroled 
                                                 
 25. Id. 
 26. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 27. The 2008 Farm Bill changed the name of the program to the Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program (SNAP) as a way to fight the stigma the term “food stamps” had acquired. A Short 
History of SNAP, supra note 21. 
 28. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1099. 
 29. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193 (1996). 
 30. Katherine Anne Paddock Betcher, Note, Revisiting the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act and Calling for Equality: Problematic Moral Regulations and the 
Changing Legal Status of LGBT Families in a New Obama Administration, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 104, 114 (2009). The “Contract with America” was a Republican conservative moral and eco-
nomic philosophy based around President Reagan’s 1985 State of the Union Address and heavily 
emphasized curtailing welfare spending. Id. 
 31. David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program 
in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1289 & n.55 (2004). 
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 33. 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (2012). 
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into the United States for at least one year; immigrants whose deporta-
tion was being withheld; immigrants who had been granted conditional 
entry; certain Cuban and Haitian entrants; and certain victims of battery 
or extreme cruelty by a spouse or other family members.34 All other legal 
immigrants that did not fit within these categories were no longer eligible 
for the federal funds.35 
PRWORA also implemented additional criteria that a “qualified al-
ien” must meet in order to be eligible for federal benefits. The most rele-
vant criterion for this Comment’s focus is the requirement that the indi-
vidual maintain her qualified status for five or more years to be eligible.36 
States that administer SNAP are required under PRWORA to extend eli-
gibility to classes of “qualified aliens.”37 However, states are able to cre-
ate their own eligibility requirements for legal immigrants that are nei-
ther barred from receiving nor required to receive benefits. 
Under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1997, 
states were given the option to issue benefits to individuals who were 
ineligible to participate in the federal food stamp program solely as a 
result of section 402 or 403 of PRWORA (8 U.S.C. § 1612 or § 1613),38 
which included the citizenship and alien-status requirements that barred 
Ms. Pimentel. 
In response to the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 
and the PRWORA eligibility restrictions, Washington State enacted FAP 
for legal immigrants in 1997.39 Under FAP, legal immigrants are eligible 
to receive food assistance if (1) they meet the pre-PRWORA alien-status 
requirements of the Food Stamp Act; and (2) their ineligibility for federal 
food stamps is due solely to PRWORA’s alien-status eligibility provi-
sions, as defined in Washington Administrative Code § 388-424-0020.40 
FAP was championed through both chambers of Washington’s leg-
islature with bipartisan support and was passed unanimously in both 
chambers.41 In fact, Washington was among the first of eleven states to 
create food assistance programs for those legal immigrants not eligible to 
                                                 
 34. Id. § 1641(b)–(c). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Pimentel v. Dreygus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1100 n.5 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 37. 8 U.S.C. § 1622(b)(1)–(3) (2012). 
 38. 7 U.S.C § 2016(i) (2012). 
 39. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.08A.120 (2013). 
 40. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-424-0025 (2013). 
 41. Final Bill Report: ESB 6098, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE (Apr. 17, 1997), 
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/1997-98/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/6098.FBR.pdf.  
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receive SNAP.42 Washington was motivated by deep cultural and eco-
nomic ties to non-citizens, a desire to have a welfare program that did not 
discriminate against any group of people, and the goal to ensure equal 
treatment for immigrants past, present, and future.43 
Upon FAP’s creation, the program was administered by DSHS 
alongside SNAP, under Washington’s “Basic Food Program.”44 A 
household is eligible for Basic Food as long as one member of the 
household is eligible for either SNAP or FAP.45 Households can receive 
both SNAP and FAP as long as the total household benefit does not ex-
ceed a maximum amount.46 In Ms. Pimentel’s case, her two youngest 
children were receiving SNAP because they are U.S. citizens, while she 
and her oldest son (both qualified aliens) received FAP.47 “DSHS uses a 
single application form and a single eligibility-review form for food, 
medical, cash, and other public benefits.”48 Neither the application nor 
the eligibility-review form indicates that there are two separate funding 
sources or otherwise distinguishes between federally and state-funded 
food benefits.49 DSHS does not communicate to recipients if they were 
found eligible to receive FAP or SNAP; recipients are informed simp-
ly whether they are eligible for the Basic Food Program.50 This lack of 
distinction is important for the discussion of Ms. Pimentel’s due process 
                                                 
 42. The other states include California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Texas. Stacy Dean & Kelly Carmody, States Now Have 
the Option to Purchase Food Stamps to Provide Food Assistance to Legal Immigrants, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 4, 1997), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=archivePage& 
id=statepur.htm. For more information about the other states’ approaches to these new programs, see 
Lauren E. Moynihan, Welfare Reform and the Meaning of Membership: Constitutional Challenges 
and State Reactions, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 657, 674–75 (1998). 
 43. Scrambling to Repair Immigrant Safety Net, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 8, 1997), http://commun 
ity.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19970408&slug=2532769. The Seattle Times noted 
that state legislators criticized the new federal welfare reform laws because they did “not reflect 
Washington’s commitment to those legal immigrants within Washington’s borders who have played 
by the rules and who live in our communities and participate in the American way of life, providing 
economic and cultural enrichment to Washington State’s population.” Id.; see also Kery Murakami, 
Study, or Lose $173 A Month, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, http://community.seattletimes.nwsour 
ce.com/archive/?date=19970225&slug=2525669; Kery Murakami, Locke Not Far from GOP Wel-
fare Plan—Governor Takes a Touch Stance on Aid Limits, Required Work, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 26, 
1997, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19970226&slug=2525852. 
 44. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-400-0045; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-478-0060.9. 
 47. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1104. 
 48. Id. at 1101. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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claims in regards to the notices she received about her approval for FAP 
and its subsequent elimination. This is discussed further in section C.51 
B. Impact of the Elimination of FAP 
Almost fifteen years after Washington led the nation in affirming its 
commitment to provide for the state’s legal immigrant population, Wash-
ington’s reduction of FAP benefits by fifty percent and the possible elim-
ination of the program has had drastic effects in the state. The cuts to 
FAP primarily impacted families of color,52 which deepens racial ine-
quality in Washington State. Before the reduction, FAP helped to feed an 
“estimated 12,000 children whose families [came] from places such as 
Mexico, Eritrea, Vietnam[,] and the South Pacific.”53 As a result of the 
cuts, the average benefit of $115 per month per person was reduced to 
$55 per month per person. This change means that families’ food budgets 
were reduced to less than $2 a day per person—an insufficient amount to 
purchase nutritious foods for a healthy diet.54 The loss of benefits also 
“caused many families to visit hospitals and clinics because of belly ache 
known as ‘Empty Stomach,’” resulting in medical bills these families 
could not afford to pay.55 
FAP also serves as a form of economic stimulus for the state. Fami-
lies that purchase food with these FAP benefits put money back into the 
local community.56 The money families receive through FAP “go direct-
ly to community grocery stores across the state, making a $9 local eco-
nomic impact for every $5 in benefits spent on food, according to the 
USDA. Eliminating the program would cause local communities to miss 
out on over $100 million in economic impact. . . .”57 
                                                 
 51. See infra Part II.C. 
 52. Hungry in Washington: September 2012, CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE, 4 (Sept. 6, 2012), 
http://www.childrensalliance.org/sites/default/files/Hungry_in_Washington_2012.pdf. 
 53. Press Release, Children’s Alliance, Community Organizations Speak Up: Equal Benefits 
for Hungry Families (Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Equal Benefits for Hungry Families], available at 
http://www.childrensalliance.org/sites/default/files/Press_Release_Food_Assistance_Immigrant_Fa
milies.pdf. 
 54. Children, Opportunity and State Food Assistance, CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://www.childrensalliance.org/sites/default/files/Children_and_State_Food_Assistance_March201
3.pdf. 
 55. Equal Benefits for Hungry Families, supra note 53. 
 56. The Facts About State Food Assistance, CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE, 2 (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.childrensalliance.org/sites/default/files/FactsAboutStateFoodAssistance20111411.pdf. 
 57. Id. 
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C. Procedural History of Pimentel v. Dreyfus 
Ms. Pimentel was married to a United States citizen who was abu-
sive.58 In 2006, she filed an I-360 Self-Petition under the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994.59 Ms. Pimentel established a 
prima facie case that she was a victim of domestic violence for the Self-
Petition and was granted legal status.60 
Under Washington law, she and her oldest son become qualified al-
iens because of her status as a victim of domestic violence, and subse-
quently, they were eligible to receive FAP benefits.61 Ms. Pimentel had 
received food assistance since 2005.62 With this assistance, Ms. Pimentel 
was able to leave her abuser and support herself and her children inde-
pendently.63 
The fact that FAP and SNAP benefits are administered under the 
unified title of Washington’s Basic Food Program raises the question of 
whether the state provided sufficient notice to FAP recipients regarding 
their eligibility for food assistance, as well as the elimination of the pro-
gram. The first notice that Ms. Pimentel received in January 2011 in-
formed her that the “state-funded Food Assistance Program (FAP) will 
end . . . because of state budget cuts. You don’t have administrative hear-
ing rights when a program ends.”64 Near the end of the letter, a line was 
included that stated, “[Y]ou may ask to have the case reviewed. You can 
also ask for an administrative hearing.”65 The letter also listed Ms. Pi-
mentel and her son as members of the household receiving FAP benefits 
and the amount that the household would continue to receive once the 
FAP benefits were terminated.66 
The second notice that Ms. Pimentel received was sent to all house-
holds that received a combination of FAP and SNAP benefits, and again 
Ms. Pimentel was notified of FAP’s elimination and that she did not have 
administrative rights.67 The notice included a description of FAP, and it 
was the first time that Ms. Pimentel learned that she and her son were on 
                                                 
 58. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Brief for Legal Momentum as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 18, Pi-
mentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-35237). 
 64. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1103. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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a different food program than her youngest children.68 Neither this notice 
nor any previous communication from DSHS explained that Ms. Pimen-
tel and her son were receiving state-funded assistance rather than federal-
ly funded assistance, and DSHS did not explain how this alien status de-
termination was made. Similar to the first notice, the second notice ended 
informing Ms. Pimentel of her privilege to request an administrative 
hearing. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in its opinion, the second notice 
did not explain how DSHS determined that Ms. Pimentel and her son 
were “qualified aliens” eligible for FAP, but not SNAP.69 The notice also 
did not show how DSHS computed the FAP or SNAP benefits in accord-
ance with Washington Administrative Code § 388-450-0140.70 
After the lawsuit commenced, Ms. Pimentel received a third notice 
from DSHS that explained which documents DSHS reviewed to deter-
mine who in the household was eligible for state-funded assistance in-
stead of federally funded assistance.71 
Ms. Pimentel’s case was first heard in the United State District 
Court for the Western District of Washington in February 2011. The 
judge entered a temporary restraining order and certified a class for the 
Equal Protection claim as well as a subclass for the Due Process claim.72 
The Equal Protection class comprised of 10,350 households, approxi-
mately 14,350 individuals who received 
state-funded Basic Food benefits under FAP and received notifica-
tion that these benefits would terminate . . . or are qualified aliens 
(or persons permanently residing in the United States under color of 
law) who in the future would be eligible for Basic Food benefits, 
but for the fact that they do not meet the citizenship and alien-status 
requirements of WAC 388-424-0020.73 
The Due Process subclass comprised of Washington State residents who 
were receiving FAP and whose benefits were now being reduced or elim-
inated.74 The district court applied the four-factor test set forth in Winter 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., which is used when a plaintiff is seek-
ing a preliminary injunction.75 A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion must establish (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the 
                                                 
 68. Id. at 1104. 
 69. Id. at 1103. 
 70. Id. at 1104. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1104–05. 
 74. Id. at 1105. 
 75. Id. (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). 
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likelihood of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 
relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) 
that an injunction is in the public interest.76 Courts employ a “sliding 
scale” approach when balancing these factors so that a stronger showing 
of one factor can offset a weaker showing of another.77 The district court 
found that these four factors all weighed heavily in Ms. Pimentel’s favor; 
it issued the injunction and applied a strict scrutiny standard of review to 
the proposed elimination.78 The court enjoined Susan Dreyfus, the Secre-
tary of DSHS, from terminating Ms. Pimentel’s or other class members’ 
state-funded food assistance while the litigation was pending. In addi-
tion, the court ordered the state to provide Due Process subclass mem-
bers with individualized determination notices explaining their ineligibil-
ity for the federally funded SNAP program.79 
In response to the district court’s decision, Secretary Drey-
fus appealed the ruling, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the 
case in August 2011. The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the lower 
court’s ruling and the injunction, finding that Ms. Pimentel—and there-
fore the class she represented—did not have standing to bring an Equal 
Protection or Due Process challenge to the state’s decision.80 
The Washington State Legislature subsequently signed into law 
Engrossed Substitute House Bill 1086, which provided a supplemental 
operating budget for the remainder of fiscal year 2011 (i.e., until June 30, 
2011), and mandated that FAP benefits “be fifty percent of the [SNAP] 
benefit amount.”81 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL’S LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review: How the Court Decided Pimentel v. Dreyfus 
In Pimentel, the Ninth Circuit began by establishing that when re-
viewing a decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, the court 
will employ an abuse of discretion standard.82 The Ninth Circuit applies 
a two-part test to determine whether the district court abused its discre-
tion. First, the Ninth Circuit determines de novo “whether the trial court 
                                                 
 76. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 
 77. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1105. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1104–05. 
 80. Id. at 1111 (reversing the district court’s order granting the motion for the preliminary 
injunction, vacating the injunction, and remanding for further proceeding consistent with the opin-
ion; opinion is without a dissent). 
 81. 2011 Wash. Sess. Law 78. 
 82. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1105. 
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identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested.”83 Se-
cond, it determines if the district court’s use of the correct legal standard 
was “(1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences 
that may be drawn from the facts in the record.”84 
The Ninth Circuit found error in the district court’s application of a 
strict scrutiny standard of review to the repeal of FAP because there was 
no threshold showing of discrimination. The Ninth Circuit found that the 
discrimination threshold was not met because the entire state-based pro-
gram had been repealed, and the state-based program and the federal 
food stamp program were not comparable programs.85 
B. The Court’s Application of Legal Formalism 
Legal formalism involves the strict application of precedents, me-
chanical jurisprudence, and the separation of legal reasoning from nor-
mative or policy considerations.86 Some leading constitutional formalist 
theories include original intent,87 original meaning,88 and tradition.89 
These legal formalist theories share an important trait: the belief that us-
ing the past to determine the present and future is a desirable feature in 
constitutional interpretation. The legal formalist deference to prior case 
law and tradition becomes problematic, however, when dealing with 
what could be construed as a newly recognized fundamental right—food 
security. In fact, several countries around the world have already recog-
nized that food security and access to affordable food is a fundamental 
right.90 
In Pimentel, the Ninth Circuit stated that regardless of the level of 
scrutiny a court applies, a plaintiff must show that the state treated her 
differently from similarly situated individuals in order to state an Equal 
Protection claim of any kind.91 A plaintiff must meet this threshold 
showing before a court may continue on to determine if the basis of the 
                                                 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (citing Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 
2010), cert. granted on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 992 (2011)). 
 85. Id. at 1106–08. 
 86. See Davis, supra note 18, at 9–10; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formal-
ism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001); Richard A. 
Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 82 MICH. L. REV. 827, 831 (1988). 
 87. The original intent theory is a “constant search for framers’ intent and the use of 
originalism as a basis for constitutional interpretation.” Chemerinsky, supra note 86, at 5. 
 88. Id. at 7. 
 89. Id. at 11. 
 90. The Right to Food, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/ 
worldfoodsummit/english/fsheets/food.pdf (last visited May 28, 2014). 
 91. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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discrimination merits strict scrutiny.92 The Ninth Circuit found that Ms. 
Pimentel could not compare former or current FAP recipients to the cur-
rent SNAP recipients because SNAP is strictly federally funded and FAP 
is strictly state funded and thus has no bearing on the federally funded 
program.93 These two groups of people were not “similarly situated” ac-
cording to the court.94 The Ninth Circuit held that because Ms. Pimentel 
did not point to other individuals in Washington that were receiving a 
“FAP-like, state-funded food assistance benefits,” the elimination of FAP 
did not constitute discrimination, “much less alienage-based discrimina-
tion.”95 According to the Ninth Circuit, because Ms. Pimentel did not 
meet the “similarly situated” standard, the district court erred in applying 
strict scrutiny to the state’s decision to eliminate the program.96 
The court’s application of this formulaic rule ignores the reality that 
the elimination of the program did affect people solely based on their 
alienage status. Members of the same household, of the same family unit, 
sharing the same food, were treated differently depending on their immi-
gration status. In fact, as of November 2012, approximately two-thirds of 
the households that received FAP benefits also included someone who 
received SNAP benefits.97 This disconnect from reality is demonstrated 
by the fact that Ms. Pimentel and her oldest son lost their food assistance 
benefits, but her youngest children, two U.S. citizens, did not. 
The application of legal formalism is also seen in the court’s con-
struction of the class members. The court created a sui generis98 sub-
group of legal immigrants who received FAP due to ineligibility for 
SNAP because of the PRWORA restrictions.99 Because the court inter-
preted this class so narrowly, it was impossible to compare this group to 
other residents receiving food assistance in Washington and therefore 
impossible to discriminate against this subgroup. However, in reality, 
this means that people in the same household were not comparable, even 
though based on the notices from DSHS, it was never clear that there was 
such a distinction. Even so, because of the court’s adherence to legal 
formalism, Ms. Pimentel and the class of persons she represented—
approximately 3,491 households—were never discriminated against be-
                                                 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1107. 
 94. Id. at 1106–07. 
 95. Id. at 1109. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Policy Brief: State Food Assistance, supra note 11. 
 98. Sui generis means “of its own kind or class.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 99. See Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1104–05. 
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cause none of them were eligible for federal food assistance, and they 
had all been excluded from receiving further aid from the state. 
Courts have applied legal formalism by creating sui generis sub-
groups in the past. For example, in Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme 
Court reviewed a California disability insurance program that excluded 
pregnancy-related disabilities from its coverage for the insured.100 The 
Court held that there was no gender discrimination because the law simp-
ly divided potential recipients into two groups based on a physical condi-
tion (not gender)—pregnant and non-pregnant persons.101 The Court con-
structed a sui generis subcategory of pregnant women, which were only 
comparable to other members of the subgroup, meaning other pregnant 
women. Because everyone in the subgroup was equally not insured for 
pregnancy-related disabilities, the plaintiffs did not meet the threshold 
required to show that the class members were treated differently than 
similarly situated members, and therefore, failed to meet the threshold to 
show gender discrimination.102 The Court seemed to stick its head in the 
sand by ignoring the obvious fact that only females can get pregnant, and 
therefore, would be the only group negatively impacted by this law.103 
This holding was overturned by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978.104 
The Ninth Circuit in Pimentel followed the Supreme Court’s exam-
ple and narrowly constructed the subclass. Ms. Pimentel and the other 
class members were not categorized as legal immigrants, residents, or 
even as “qualified aliens” receiving food assistance, which would have 
allowed for a broader comparison and more “similarly situated” individ-
uals. Instead, the court narrowly defined this subgroup, even though it 
cut across family lines, and there was no public acknowledgement by 
DSHS that there even was this distinction between SNAP and FAP recip-
ients. The illogical outcomes of these cases demonstrate the importance 
                                                 
 100. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), overruled by Newport News Shipbuilding & 
Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) and by statute in Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq., 701(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et 
seq., 2000e(k). 
 101. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n. 20. 
 102. Id. at 496. 
 103. See id. at 501–03 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In effect, one set of rules is applied to fe-
males and another to males. Such dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical 
characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination . . . . I cannot 
join the Court’s apparent retreat. I continue to adhere to my view that ‘classifications based upon 
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and 
must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.’” (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 688 (1973)). 
 104. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). 
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of how classes and subclasses are defined. The definition of each sub-
class essentially determines whether or not there are other individuals 
who are “similarly situated.” 
IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO GAIN STANDING AND TO PROMOTE 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
Courts and scholars have recognized that there are alternative 
methods to find standing for Equal Protection and Due Process challeng-
es. One such scholarly theory is Charles Reich’s “New Property” con-
cept, which has been recognized as a tool for “converting the due process 
clause into a tool of civil justice.”105 Reich argued that a broader concep-
tion of property is essential to the preservation of civil liberties.106 Re-
becca Zeitlow also explores how welfare benefits came to be understood 
as positive entitlements, which are protected under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses.107 She makes a compelling point, which rings 
true in the case of Ms. Pimentel: “People who are disempowered due to 
their race, class, or gender need a formalized, structured process so that 
their rights can be protected. They are, however, in grave danger of los-
ing not only their benefits but the empowerment of due process as a re-
sult of current welfare reform measures.”108 
This Part argues that the court should find a fundamental right to 
food security as a way to ensure that recipients of food benefits have a 
property interest in their state benefits and can fight for equal treatment. 
This Part also suggests that the court should have adopted a broader un-
derstanding of the construction of an Equal Protection subclass to ensure 
legal immigrants’ access to the justice system. Lastly, this Part examines 
the court’s treatment of Ms. Pimentel’s case in the larger context of 
states’ efforts to balance budgets while addressing the needs of the im-
migrant community. 
A. Finding a Fundamental Right to Food Security 
An alternative method to gain standing would be for the court to 
recognize Ms. Pimentel’s property interest in FAP by finding a funda-
mental right to food. The Ninth Circuit rejected Ms. Pimentel’s proce-
                                                 
 105. Paul R. Verkuil, Revisiting the New Property After Twenty-Five Years, 31 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 365, 365 (1990). 
 106. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771, 777, 785–787 (1964). 
 107. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don’t Add up to Rights: The Importance of Preserving 
Due Process Rights in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111, 1121–24 
(1996). 
 108. Id. at 1121. 
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dural due process claim because it stated that “it is unclear what property 
interest Pimentel alleges as the foundation for her procedural due process 
claim.”109 The court went on to say that property interests are “created 
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules . . . that stem from an 
independent source such as state law.”110 Because Washington State vol-
untarily chose to create this food assistance program, Ms. Pimentel and 
the members of the class were akin to “temporary beneficiaries of the 
state’s charity . . . and lack[ed] any standing to complain of discrimina-
tion when that assistance was withdrawn.”111 However, if the court found 
that Ms. Pimentel did have a cognizable property interest in the FAP 
benefits—by finding a fundamental right to food—it could have found 
that she had standing to argue the merits of her case. 
A right to food was first recognized internationally in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and also included in the 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).112 In response to this commitment, the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Commission established the mandate of the Special Rappor-
teur on the right to food, who in subsequent reports created a more con-
crete and operational description of what this right entails.113 While the 
United States has not ratified the ICESCR,114 according to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, twenty-two countries 
that have ratified the Convention have also included a right to food in 
their constitutions.115 
Some scholars of international law theorize that the United States 
might be required under customary international law to adopt a right to 
                                                 
 109. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 110. Id. at 1110. (citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005)). 
 111. Westley, supra note 17. 
 112. Oliver De Schutter, Right to Food, U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD, 
http://www.srfood.org/en/right-to-food (last visited May 29, 2014). 
 113. Id.  
The right to food is a human right recognized under international law which protects the 
right of all human beings to feed themselves in dignity, either by producing their food or 
by purchasing it. . . . To purchase food, a person needs adequate incomes: the right to 
food consequently requires States to ensure that . . . social safety nets enable citizens to 
realize their right to adequate food. 
Id. 
 114. Status of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTIONS (Mar. 8, 2014), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en. 
 115. Some of these countries include Brazil, Bolivia, Columbia, Nigeria, Uganda, South Afri-
ca, India, and Pakistan. The Right to Food, supra note 90, at 2. 
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food.116 However, the United States has persistently objected to and de-
nied any legal obligations under statutory or customary international law, 
and therefore even if a right to food was considered customary interna-
tional law, the United States would likely be exempt as a “persistent ob-
jector.”117 
Although the right to food does not mean the right to be fed, it does 
require that the state guarantee accessibility, which means that food must 
be affordable.118 While the Supreme Court has not recognized a funda-
mental right to food, the mission of the federal government’s food assis-
tance program closely aligns with the internationally recognized ele-
ments of the right to food. The mission of the government’s food assis-
tance program is to “increase food security and reduce hunger . . . by 
providing children and low-income people with access to food, a health-
ful diet, and nutrition education. . . .”119 Similarly, an important element 
of the internationally recognized right to food is that “[i]ndividuals 
should be able to afford food for an adequate diet without compromising 
on any other basic needs, such as school fees, medicines[,] or rent.”120 
However, the result of the severe reduction of FAP made families, like 
Ms. Pimentel’s, have to do exactly this: choose between rent, food, and 
medical care.121 
The Ninth Circuit expressed a legitimate concern that enjoining 
states from eliminating state-funded programs for the benefit of legal 
immigrants would deter states from establishing these programs in this 
first place.122 However, finding a fundamental right to food would not 
require that a state government always provide a statutorily subsidized 
food program like FAP. Yet, it would require the government to find al-
ternative means to promote the accessibility of food, which is already at 
the core of both the federal and Washington State’s missions with regard 
                                                 
 116. Lily Endean Nierenberg, Note, Reconciling the Right to Food and Trade Liberalization: 
Developing Country Opportunities, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 619, 630–31 (2011). 
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 119. Nutrition Education and Promotion, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOOD & NUTRITION SERVICE, 
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to food security.123 These alternative means could include expanding 
school lunch programs—which provide free or subsidized school lunches 
and breakfasts to enrolled school children, regardless of immigration sta-
tus—or expanding funding for food banks, meal plan programs, and 
community P patches.124 
As discussed above, there has already been a movement in other 
countries to establish this fundamental right to food.125 But how have 
other states in the Union dealt with this potential right? Is this a likely 
fundamental right for Congress or the United States Supreme Court to 
adopt? 
The United States Supreme Court has historically been hesitant to 
find new non-textual fundamental rights that would require a higher 
standard of scrutiny. The Court noted in Bowers v. Hardwick that it was 
not “inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover 
new fundamental rights. . . . The Court is most vulnerable and comes 
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law 
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Con-
stitution.”126 
However, the Court has found non-textual fundamental rights when 
it determined that the right was so “‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty . . . neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,’ 
or that it ‘[is] deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.’”127 The 
Court actually explicitly overruled its holding in Bowers and found a 
fundamental right to privacy in Lawrence v. Texas;128 nonetheless, the 
Court still declined to find a fundamental right to physician assisted sui-
cide in Washington v. Glucksberg.129 
                                                 
 123. See Food Assistance Program, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF. AGRIC., http://agr.wa.gov/FoodProg/ 
(last modified Nov. 20, 2012). 
 124. For more suggestions on alternative means to promote accessibility to food, see 10 Point 
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 129. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
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Regarding a fundamental right to food, some states have taken steps 
that demonstrate that this right is, in fact, an important liberty interest.130 
PRWORA not only disqualified hundreds of thousands of legal immi-
grants from eligibility for benefits but also instituted certification peri-
ods, in some cases of up to three months, before other recipients could 
become eligible to receive food stamps.131 However, several states, in-
cluding Oregon, Florida, and Illinois, created exceptions for many cate-
gories of recipients so that they could avoid this waiting period,132 recog-
nizing the importance of immediate access to affordable food. 
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held in Banks v. Block133 that food as-
sistance recipients did not have a constitutionally protected right to these 
benefits after the expiration of these certification periods.134 President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, however, famously included the right of ac-
cess to adequate food in his “Second Bill of Rights,” introduced during 
the New Deal period, a further indication that this right is rooted in our 
nation’s history.135 
However, with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to find non-textual 
fundamental rights and the United States’ persistent objections to a right 
to food under international law, it is unlikely that the Court or govern-
ment will adopt this right. Therefore, it will likely not be a successful 
alternative method to gain standing for legal immigrants trying to access 
the justice system to protect food assistance benefits. 
B. Broadening the Construction of Equal Protection Classes 
In regards to Ms. Pimentel’s Equal Protection claim, the Ninth Cir-
cuit could have adopted a broader interpretation of the certified class. 
The court cites to Hong Pham v. Starkowski136 as authority for its narrow 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.137 However, Hong Pham is 
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 137. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012). 
1424 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1405 
a Connecticut Supreme Court case and is not binding authority in Wash-
ington or in the Ninth Circuit. In fact, just one month before Pimentel, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii heard a case similar to 
Hong Pham and rejected the Connecticut Supreme Court’s narrow inter-
pretation of the test required by the Equal Protection Clause as an “ab-
surd” interpretation.138 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii in Korab v. 
McManaman139 questioned the very premise that the court in Hong Pham 
(and thus the Ninth Circuit in Pimentel) based its decision on: for the 
Equal Protection Clause to apply, the court must decide “whether the 
state program provides a benefit to citizens that it does not provide to 
some or all aliens because of their status as noncitizens.”140 The court 
stated: 
By limiting the inquiry to a particular program on its own as op-
posed to a state’s provision of medical benefits to its residents 
through various different programs[,] generally, Hong Pham would 
allow a state to create separate programs that provide different ben-
efits based on suspect classification (i.e., alienage, race, gender). A 
state could, for example, create one medical benefits program with 
limited benefits for African Americans, and another program with 
greater benefits for Caucasians. Under Hong Pham’s reasoning, 
there would apparently be no suspect classification based on race 
because neither individual program provides a benefit to one race 
that it does not provide to individuals of other races because of their 
race. Such an absurd (and insidious) result stands the Equal Protec-
tion Clause on its head.141 
Moreover, Hong Pham is not rooted in federal jurisprudence.142 
There is, in fact, no binding authority in Washington State or in the Ninth 
Circuit that supports this narrow interpretation. Yet, despite this lack of 
authority, the Pimentel court narrowly defined the class for the Equal 
Protection claim and then, after applying the Hong Pham rationale, found 
no discrimination had taken place.143 This narrow interpretation is also 
not consistent with jurisprudence in other federal circuit courts dealing 
                                                 
 138. 805 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1037 (D. Hawaii 2011). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1037 (citing Hong Pham, 16 A.3d 635). 
 141. Id. at 1036. In both Hong Pham and Korab, the measure being eliminated was a state-
funded medical benefit program for legal immigrants. 
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 143. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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with the construction of Equal Protection subclasses.144 For example, the 
First Circuit opined that the “formula for determining whether individu-
als or entities are ‘similarly situated’ for equal protection purposes is not 
always susceptible to precise demarcation.”145 In Dartmouth Review v. 
Dartmouth College, the First Circuit outlined: 
The test is whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the in-
cidents, would think them roughly equivalent and the protagonists 
similarly situated . . . the ‘relevant aspects’ are those factual ele-
ments which determine whether reasoned analogy supports, or de-
mands a like result. Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary, 
but the cases must be fair congeners. In other words, apples should 
be compared to apples.146 
Had the Pimentel court followed the lead of the First Circuit and the 
district courts of Maine and Hawaii, and applied a broader less formulaic 
test to Ms. Pimentel’s claim, it would have found that she had standing to 
litigate her claim. The court could have then moved on to review the dis-
trict court’s application of the Winter test regarding the preliminary in-
junction. 
This test requires a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction to es-
tablish (1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of 
suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that 
the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) that an injunc-
tion is in the public interest.147 On appeal, the State only challenged one 
prong of the court’s Winter factor test analysis.148 The State did not chal-
lenge that Ms. Pimentel and the class members she represented were 
likely to suffer irreparable harm, nor did it challenge that the “balance of 
hardships and public interest weigh[ed] in the class’s favor.”149 The State 
only challenged Ms. Pimentel’s likelihood of success on the merits of her 
claim—the first factor of the Winter test.150 By applying a formulaic, nar-
row interpretation of an Equal Protection class, the Ninth Circuit pre-
cluded Ms. Pimentel from even arguing the merits of her claim. 
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1426 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:1405 
C. State Budget Concerns and the Elimination of Programs                            
for Legal Immigrants 
Like Washington State, many states have had to deal with trimming 
their budgets and deciding which programs will end up on the chopping 
block, and in several states the programs cut are those that provide bene-
fits to legal immigrants.151 
For example, as already discussed in section B, the Connecticut leg-
islature chose to terminate a separate health care program that provided 
medical coverage to lawfully residing immigrants.152 In Hong Pham, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court found that the decision to eliminate this pro-
gram did not constitute discrimination on the basis of alienage.153 
However, in Finch v. Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector 
Authority, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that the state legis-
lature’s attempt to bar legal immigrants from a state-funded health care 
plan violated the equal protections granted by Massachusetts State Con-
stitution.154 In 2009, Massachusetts created a slimmed-down version for 
legal immigrants of the state’s health coverage plan provided to citi-
zens.155 In a unanimous opinion, the court held that “the discrimination 
against legal immigrants that [the state law’s] limiting language embod-
ies violates their rights to equal protection. . . .”156 The court recognized 
that this decision will mean that Massachusetts will have to appropriate 
additional funds in order to comply; however, the court stated that 
“[f]iscal considerations alone cannot justify a [s]tate’s invidious discrim-
ination against aliens.”157 The district court in Pimentel also expressed a 
similar concern in its opinion, noting that “Plaintiff’s and classes’ suffer-
ing ‘is far more compelling than the possibility of some administrative 
inconvenience or monetary loss to the government.’”158 
However, in a more recent case with similar facts to Finch, another 
court went in a different direction. In early 2012, the Maine legislature 
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passed a new law that requires legal immigrants to wait five years before 
applying for MaineCare Benefits, a state-funded health plan.159 In Bruns 
v. Mayhew, the class action lawsuit’s lead plaintiff, Hans Bruns, peti-
tioned the court to grant a permanent injunction, which would enjoin the 
Commissioner of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services 
from enforcing this law.160 Similar to Ms. Pimentel, Bruns challenged 
this law based on Equal Protection Clause grounds, arguing that “it dis-
criminates against noncitizens in favor of citizens in the administration of 
MaineCare benefits.”161 In November 2012, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Maine denied the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss 
Bruns’s claim, which appeared to be a sign that the court was moving 
towards adopting a broader construction of the Equal Protection class.162 
However, on March 14, 2013, the court ultimately denied Bruns’s mo-
tion for the preliminary injunction, citing both Pimentel and Hong Pham 
in its rationale.163 The court held: 
Without the guidance of clear First Circuit precedent, the Court fol-
lows the well-reasoned legal analysis of courts in other jurisdic-
tions, such as Pimentel and Pham. The Court concludes that it can-
not award preliminary injunctive relief to the Plaintiffs because 
there were two separate programs distributing medical benefits to 
Medicaid-ineligible qualified aliens and citizens. Because citizens 
were statutorily unable to receive health benefits under the same 
state-sponsored program, the Plaintiffs are unable to show they 
were similarly situated with citizens for equal protection purpos-
es. In other words, the Plaintiffs cannot show that the State engaged 
in selective treatment because Maine’s 1997 law never included the 
Plaintiffs in a benefit group with citizens.164 
Although the majority of cases that dealt with the elimination of a 
wholly state-funded public benefit program for legal immigrants have 
not found constitutional violations, there is still hope that, at least in 
Washington State, food assistance for legal immigrants will be protected 
and preserved. On March 19, 2013, twenty-six of the forty-nine state 
senators voiced their support to reinstate full funding for FAP for the 
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2013–2015 budget.165 The senators signed a letter that was sent to the 
Senate Ways and Means Committee that, in part, stated: 
For more than 15 years Washington state government has strategi-
cally leveraged resources to make sure that food stamps are availa-
ble to help families when times are tough. The Legislature led the 
country in 1997 in establishing the State Food Assistance pro-
gram. . . . At a time when an estimated one-in-four Washington 
children live in food-insecure households, the 2011 cut to State 
Food Assistance deepened the economic inequality for many of the 
youngest Washingtonians. . . . The legislature should restore these 
funds so that all children and families who need help filling the 
hunger gap are treated equally.166 
The letter urged the Senate Ways and Means Committee to allocate 
$42 million to restore the program in the 2013–2015 state budget.167 This 
letter, along with the lobbying efforts of many community groups, helped 
preserve funding for FAP.168 Although the legislature did not fully re-
store funding to FAP, on July 1, 2013, Governor Jay Inslee signed the 
2013–2015 Biennium and 2013 Supplemental Budget, which increased 
the funding for FAP by 25% from the 50% reduction level of 2011.169 
Recipients will receive 75% of the SNAP benefit level.170 
Although this was a victory for FAP recipients, it was short-lived. 
Recipients of both FAP and SNAP have been deeply impacted by the 
recent cuts to the federal food stamps program that went into effect on 
November 1, 2013, as well as the additional cuts that came with the new 
Farm Bill, passed by the U.S. Congress on February 5, 2014.171 
V. CONCLUSION 
Access to the justice system is a powerful tool for anyone fighting 
against an injustice. One effective way to promote a greater access to the 
justice system is for the courts to employ a legal realist’s approach when 
faced with Equal Protection and Due Process challenges. Legal realism, 
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unlike legal formalism, includes societal factors as variables in the legal 
analysis. This could include defining a subgroup more broadly in an 
Equal Protection claim in order to allow standing for members of vulner-
able groups, which would have allowed Ms. Pimentel to argue the merits 
of her case and potentially preserve her benefits. 
Because of the Ninth Circuit’s application of legal formalism, Ms. 
Pimentel—and others that relied on FAP benefits to survive—lost. How-
ever, the courts often swing between times of adherence to legal formal-
ism and legal realism. Had the Ninth Circuit applied a legal realist per-
spective to its review of the state’s elimination of FAP and defined a 
broader class of members, similar to the First Circuit and the district 
courts of Hawaii and Maine, then it would have likely found that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for the pre-
liminary injunction. Ms. Pimentel could have argued her case based on 
the merits of the Equal Protection claim. 
Another way to promote access to the justice system would be for 
the courts to find a fundamental right to food security and recognize that 
people, like Ms. Pimentel, have a property interest in state-funded food 
assistance. As of today, solidified by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Pi-
mentel, Washington State can provide “fair weather” food assistance and 
leave thousands of people without a basic necessity and an international-
ly recognized human right—the right to be able to access affordable food 
to feed one’s self and one’s family. 
There is yet another powerful option beyond relying on constitu-
tional and statutorily granted rights—the political willpower of the citi-
zens of Washington State. The state legislature and the governor have 
already shown their support by increasing funding by 25% in the 2013 
Operating Budget. However, with continued encouragement and calls to 
action from constituents, this author hopes that the legislature will com-
pletely restore funding to this program and reaffirm Washington’s com-
mitment to its immigrant population and to all families and individuals in 
need. 
 
